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Introduction
Scholars have argued about employment effects of minimum wages for decades. Yet, it is not clear whether minimum wages have positive, negative or no effects at all on employment. Early empirical time-series studies find negative employment effects (e.g Brown et al. 1982) , panel-data approaches, such as Neumark and Wascher (1992) , seem to confirm these findings. On the contrary, case studies (e.g. Card and Krueger 1994) typically find no negative employment effects. 1 We add to the existing empirical literature by supplying new evidence on the employment effects of minimum wages. We analyze the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany on January 1 st , 2015. 2 Because there is neither variation of the minimum wage over time nor spatial variation across federal states, we cannot employ one of the classic approaches. We therefore propose to use cross-sectional variation (state-industry combinations) of the minimum wage affectedness to analyze the effects of the minimum wage on marginal and socially insured employment as well as the interaction between both forms of employment.
We compute the share of affected workers as well as the the minimum wage induced percentage average wage change. In order to identify the minimum wage effect, we firstly estimate idiosyncratic employment trends in a structural break model with endogenous breakpoint determination. This approach allows for a-priori differences between the cross sections. In a second step, we regress the trend deviations on the minimum wage variables in a simple model. Our estimations indicate a negative (positive) effect on marginal (socially insured) employment. Given these results, is seems reasonable to ask if the decrease of marginal employment ("mini-jobs", henceforth: ME) is systemically related to the positive evolution of socially insured employment (henceforth: SIE). We test this hypothesis but do not find statistic evidence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss the German minimum wage and the relevant literature in section 2. We describe the data including the derivation of the minimum wage affectedness variables in part 3. The following section is devoted to the idiosyncratic trend estimations, the identification of the minimum wage effect on ME and SIE as well as the analysis of the relationship between both forms of employment. The paper finishes with a conclusion.
The Minimum Wage in Germany
A statutory minimum wage (henceforth: MW) in Germany was subject to controversial debates long before its introduction on January 1 st , 2015. Among others, politicians, scholars, unions and various other parties argued about the effects as well as the costs and benefits of a minimum wage. The main subject of their dispute was whether or not the minimum wage would have negative employment effects. The intentions of a minimum wage are mainly concerned with an income poverty reduction as well as an enhancement of societies sense of justice (Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 2014) . The minimum wage initially amounted to 8.50e per hour and applies to the vast majority of employees. In fact, it covers approximately 98% of all employees . The initial level of the minimum wage was set by the Bundestag, a minimum wage commission is in charge of adjustments. 3
The German MW is an especially interesting research topic because it allows studying the introduction of a minimum wage rather than an increase of existing wage floors. Many economists predicted a severe negative effect on ME (e.g. Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2014) . It is useful to understand the most important difference between ME and SIE. The gap between the labour cost per hour and the net wage is a significantly smaller in case of ME compared to SIE. However, the income from ME employment must usually not exceed 450e per month. If this threshold is exceeded, the mini-job either turns into a job subject to social insurance or the match dissolves. 4 As pointed out by Henzel and Engelhardt (2014) , 40% of all mini-jobbers (i.e. more than 2 millions employees) work more than 53 hours per month and hence, receive less than 8.50e per hour in 2014. The wage increases for these workers imply that their monthly wage exceeds 450e after the MW introduction and therefore, the match is no longer eligible for a mini-job. Mini-jobs are therefore expected to be destroyed for two reasons (Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2014) . First of all, the increase in labour cost makes some matches unprofitable and 3 The commission consists of a chair person, 6 members and 2 advising, non-voting researchers. The chair is jointly suggested by the corresponding umbrella organizations of employers and employees. They also propose the members and advisers. The federal government appoints the commission. 4 See appendix for a brief discussion on ME vs SIE. therefore, they vanish. Secondly, due to the 450e cap in combination with (minimum wage induced) pay rises, a fraction of existing mini-jobs is additionally assumed to be converted into socially insured jobs, tending to further decrease marginal employment. We refer to this phenomena as the transformation effect or transformation hypothesis. The increased labour cost due the MW is likely to affect employment subject to social insurance through the first channel as well. However, the affectedness is assumed to be significantly lower than for mini-jobs and therefore, the effect is expected to be smaller (Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2014) . Notice that the second effect (transformation effect) can only have a positive effect on socially insured employment. For both forms of employment, however, labour market imperfections such as efficiency wages (e.g. Yellen, 1984) , models with a monopsony in the labour market (Manning, 1995) or search models with endogenous contact rates (Flinn, 2006) can induce an increase in employment.
The recent development of the German labour markets is depicted in Figure 1 . We observe an increase and decrease of SIE and ME in all states, respectively. Furthermore, the decrease (ME) is more pronounced in East Germany, a region associated with a high minimum wage affectedness. At the same time, the growth rates (SIE) in West Germany exceed those in East Germany (except Berlin). In order to get a better understanding of the labour markets, it useful to analyze the medium-term evolution of both forms of employment as shown in Figure 2 . The number of socially insured exhibits a solid growth III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 We aim to disentangle the minimum wage effects on employment from the evolution of the labour markets in general. Given the arguments sketched above, we expect to find a negative (positive) effect for marginal (socially insured) employment. Furthermore, we
seek to identify the transformation effect. The fact that high growth rates for SIE are accompanied with moderate decreases of ME in West Germany and low growth rates with a severe decline in East Germany, casts some doubts on the transformation hypothesis. Bossler and Gerner (2016) analyze the German minimum wage effect on employment with a DID model that uses establishment level affectedness as distinguishing feature (control group -unaffected establishments, treatment group -affected establishments) and find a small negative employment effect. Schubert et al. (2016) investigate the effects of the minimum wage in Saxony, a state heavily affected by the minimum wage 5 , and do not detect statistically significant effects on employment. Both studies crucially hinge on a common trend assumption. Garloff (2016) exploits cross-sectional variation (region, age and gender) of the minimum wage bite and obtains a negative (positive) effect on ME (SIE). To control for the dynamics of the labour market, he uses cell-specific fixed effects to control for cell-specific growth. Our approach explicitly tackles the trending behavior of each cross section by estimating idiosyncratic trends with endogenous break point determination. This allows us to compute the deviations from a counterfactual which we use to estimate the minimum wage effect on employment as well as the transformation effect.
Data
As mentioned above, we exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity to identify the minimum wage effect on employment. We construct a data set that consist of employment (ME and SIE) and wage data for 16 states and 20 industries 6 .
Recall that our intermediate objective is the estimation of idiosyncratic labour market trends. To avoid massive disturbances due the financial crisis, we set the beginning of the observation period to January 2010. The observation period ends in July 2015 (data availability). The employment variable, a workers-to-population ratio, is discussed in the first subsection.
The main part of this section, however, is devoted to the derivation of two different explanatory variables which measure the minimum wage affectedness, i.e. to what extend the wage distribution in each cross section is affected by the minimum wage (bite of the minimum wage). The statutory minimum wage was introduced in January 2015 and 5 See section 3 or Knabe and Schöb (2014) . 6 Industries according to "Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige (2008)", see Table A2 for details. therefore, we can only meaningfully compute these variables for this particular point in time.
Employment and Population
The employment variable (henceforth: EV) is the ratio of workers (SIE 7 and ME) in cross section ij (state-industry pair) over the population at working age (16-65) in state i. We choose the EV as described instead of a simple workers over population ratio because the latter neglects demographic changes. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to use state specific population data to control for demographic variation across states. This approach also captures intra-German migration. In order to find the EV, we require employment as well as population data.
The number of socially insured workers (SIE) and mini-jobbers (ME) for each cross section at a monthly frequency can be obtained from the statistics department of the Federal Employment Agency (henceforth: FEA). It is slightly more cumbersome to obtain the necessary population data. The Federal Statistical Office provides monthly population data on a state level until December 2015. To compute the population at working age, we hence need the share of the population at working age for each month on the state level.
This share on an annual basis can be found at regional statistical offices until 2015. 8 We interpolate these series with a cubic spline to convert annual data into a monthly frequency.
To obtain the population at working age in each state we combine the (interpolated)
share of the population at working age with the population data. Dividing the number of workers (socially insured and marginal employment) in each state-industry combination by the population at working age in the corresponding state yields the EV.
This ratio for both forms of employment is depicted in Figure 3 . 9 Apart from minor differences, the qualitative interpretation is identical to the picture in Figure 2 III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 Socially insured employment (left scale) Marginal employment (right scale)
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Figure 3: Employment-to-population at working age ratios (socially insured and marginal employment) in Germany. Source: Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, Federal Statistical Office, Regional Statistical Office (Saxony-Anhalt), own calculations.
Bite of the Minimum Wage
We aim to analyze if the changes in the EV depicted in the previous section are caused by the minimum wage. To proceed, we need a measurement of the bite of the minimum wage (minimum wage affectedness), i.e. a variable which quantifies to what extend the wage distribution is affected by the minimum wage. To our best knowledge, no such variable that corresponds to the cross sections used here is yet available. Our first contribution is the computation of the share of affected workers and, to overcome shortcomings of this variable, the minimum wage induced percentage average wage change for each cross section. In fact, we develop a method that allows us to compute these variables based on aggregated monthly wage data whereas they are usually inferred from micro data. As mentioned above, we only construct these variables as of December 2014.
Number of Affected Workers
For both, the share of affected workers and the percentage average change of wages due to the minimum wage, the number of affected workers in each cross section is of crucial importance. In order to find the latter, we require hourly wage data whose availability is rather unsatisfactory. We therefore use monthly income data for full time workers, i.e. we deduce the number of workers who receive less than 8.50e (i.e. affected workers) given monthly wages. The first step is to find a condition which determines, based on monthly income, whether or not a single worker receives more or less than the minimum wage. We proceed by pinning down how many workers fulfill this condition.
Define a threshold monthly income, T H ij :
where W H ij denotes the average weekly working hours in each state-industry combination.
These numbers can be obtained from the Federal Statistical Office Germany (2015).
Unfortunately, not for each industry and thus, we use aggregated values for industries. 10
Since we use weekly working hours, we scale it by factor 4.35 to obtain the monthly working hours. This procedure allows us to write down a condition which determines whether or not a worker is affected by the minimum wage. For any income w month,ij < T H ij , a worker's hourly wage is below 8.50e.
Let us now answer the question regarding the number of affected workers. We use monthly wage data for full time workers provided by the Federal Employment Agency.
This data set contains the number of workers n ij in k ∈ {1, ..., 18} intervals of increasing income 11 with upper (lower) bound U B k (LB k ) for every state-industry pair. We assume a piecewise linear distribution of workers within each interval. We assume a piecewise linear distribution of workers within each interval. Define l ij as the cross-section specific interval in which the threshold income, T H ij , is located:
This allows us to determine the number of workers with income x < T H ij as follows:
The first part of the equation above is the sum of all workers in all intervals from k = 1 to k = l. The second summand is the number of workers in interval l + 1 who receive less than the threshold income T H ij . Since we only have the total number of workers in interval l + 1, we need to scale it with the fraction in l + 1 who receives less than T H ij . A realistic, made up example is provided in the Appendix.
Share of affected workers
The share of affected workers (henceforth: SAW ) describes the fraction of workers who receive less than the minimum wage prior to its introduction in January 2015. Since we already know the number of affected workers, we simply need to divide this figure by the number of workers in the corresponding cross section, N ij , to obtain the SAW ij :
The results of this procedure are depicted in Table A4 . Industries are ordered in ascending order of affectedness whereas states are ordered alphabetically. Notice that the purpose of the minimum wage variable is to have a measure that quantifies the relative differences regarding the affectedness across cross sections. Therefore, we are not ultimately interested in the absolute value of the SAW . We observe that low-wage industries such as "Accommodation and Food Service Activities" are multiple times as exposed to the minimum wage than other industries. This also holds true for moderately affected sectors.
Furthermore, for quite a few industries the minimum wage defacto does not play a role.
From a spatial perspective, two facts strike the observer's eye. First of all, there seems to be a significant east-west gap. Within both regions, however, the differences across states are less severe. Therefore, the minimum wage affectedness heterogeneity is driven by industries and, to smaller extent, by regions rather than states.
Percentage average wage change
The share of affected workers (SAW ) as described above is an absolute measure of the bite of the minimum wage in a sense that it does not account for the distance of a worker's wage to the minimum wage. Two cross sections could be exposed in a similar fashion in terms of the SAW . However, no differentiation is made regarding the intensity of affectedness.
Suppose we find comparable values for some cross sections A and B (SAW A ≈ SAW B ).
They might however be totally different regarding the average wage of affected workers (e.g. w A = 8.40e and w B = 5.00e). It seems plausible that the impact of the minimum wage is different between these two cross sections.
To account for that possibility, we construct an alternative measure of the bite, the minimum wage induced percentage average wage change (henceforth: AW C). We build on the number of affected workers and the income data explained above and compute the average wage prior to the minimum wage as follows:
where w k ij denotes the average wage in interval k. For all k = {3 . . . 17} the average wage is simply set according to w k = 1 2 (LB k + U B k ). Since this approach is unlikely to be valid for larger intervals at the lower end of the distribution, we use micro data for k = 1, 2.
Based on the Socio-Economic Panel (2015) data set, we compute w 1 = E[w k=1 | 1e < w month ≤ 500e] and w 2 = E[w k=2 | 501e < w month ≤ 1000e]. 13 Notice that the average wage, w k , does not differ across state-industry combinations for all intervals k. It is hard to think of an argument for different average wages within each interval across cross sections.
Furthermore, we exclude interval k = 18 because it has no upper bound and thus, we cannot compute an average wage. Equation (4) is a weighted average of affected and unaffected workers. We account for the fact that the threshold income T H ij splits interval 13 There is a trade-off between the number of observations and how well the SOEP income data match the FEA employment data. If we choose only full-time employees from the SOEP sample, the number of individuals with very low wages is too low for valid inference. However, if we decide to include part-time and full-time employees, we face the problem that the FEA data only reports the number of full-time employees. Hence, the comparison of the two data sets becomes somewhat problematic. It turns out that both approaches yield identical results up to the 2 nd decimal point. The differences should thus be negligible.
l + 1 arbitrary (i.e. not according to the defined boundaries of this interval) by applying the piecewise linear distribution assumption. Hence, we scale the average wage of affected workers in l + 1 with the corresponding fraction of workers in interval l + 1. The average wage of unaffected workers in l + 1 is weighted with the the counterpart of fraction of affected workers in l + 1.
To compute the average wage after the minimum wage introduction, w post ij , we assign a value of 8.50e to all affected workers whereas we assume that the wages of unaffected workers do not change. The AW C ij is simply:
For detailed results of this procedure, see Table A5 . The results are similar to those obtained for the SAW . Unless stated otherwise, we refer to the AW C as the minimum wage affectedness or minimum variable from this stage onwards.
One could argue that we use income data on full-time regular employees who are usually assumed to be less affected by low wages than part-time workers and thus, our results may be biased. The values (SAW ) computed by Brautzsch and Schultz (2013) as well as Knabe and Schöb (2014) are based on survey data and therefore, their results do not suffer from the selection problem we face. We compare their findings for each industry-state combination available (i.e. large cross sections and states, respectively) with our estimation and compute the correlation between their values and our findings. The resulting correlation coefficients are 0.99 (Knabe and Schöb 2014) and 0.94 (Brautzsch and Schultz 2013) . The fact that the purpose of both minimum wage variables is to measure the difference across cross sections justifies using the variables as a measure of the minimum wage affectedness in case of ME although they are derived from SIE based wage date. Thus, we conclude that our computation serves as a decent proxy for a measure of the minimum wage affectedness.
Exceptions from the minimum wage
Notice that in procedure described above we assume that there are no exceptions from the minimum wage. However, as of January 2015, some industries were exempted from the statutory minimum wage. Since exceptions for agriculture and forestry were in place, we exclude the industry "Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing" in the estimation procedure.
Furthermore, the sector-specific minimum wage for temporary employment was below 8.50e per hour in East Germany and hence, the corresponding cross sections are excluded in the regressions. 14 The meat industry, the textile industry, horticulture, laundry service and hairdressing were exempted from the statutory minimum wage as well. However, they only make up a small fraction of the corresponding sector and therefore remain in the sample. 15
On the contrary, a high sector-specific minimum wage (>10e) applies to construction
workers. Yet, not every employee in the industry "Construction" is a construction worker and therefore, the minimum wage affectedness is not zero.
Estimation
As outlined above, our identification strategy of the employment effect consists of several steps. We begin with the estimation of idiosyncratic trends for each cross section and test for structural breaks (ME and SIE). We use these estimates to construct a counterfactual which in turn allows the computation of trend deviations. This approach is illustrated in Figure 4 . These trend deviations are the input in the final step of the estimation procedure.
We also try to answer the question if the effect on ME is systemically related to the impact on SIE, i.e. test the transformation hypothesis.
Idiosyncratic Trend Estimation
To analyze whether there is a systematic relationship between the minimum wage affectedness and the changes of the employment variable, one could simply regress the these changes on the minimum wage variable and some controls. However, different cross sections are likely to differ in terms of economic development during the observation period. "Administrative and Support Activities" in Berlin as well as "Arts, Entertainment and Recreation, Other Service Activities..." in Saxony (see Figure 5 ). Clearly the depicted cross sections do not follow a common trend and are thus somewhat difficult to compare.
In order to make all cross sections comparable, we estimate idiosyncratic trends with an unidentified structural break in the mean and slope as well as seasonal dummies as follows:
where y ij,t denotes the employment variable in cross section ij. This exercise (and the following) are carried out for both forms of employment, i.e. we estimate the coefficients based on y SIE ij,t as well as y M E ij,t . For the sake of readability, however, we skip the superscript unless judged beneficial. As indicated by the subscripts in (6), we account for structural differences with cross-section specific coefficients. DU and DT denote the intercept and slope dummy, respectively. 16 The point in time of the structural break, T B ij , is treated as unknown. We endogenously determine the latter for each cross section by maximizing the 16 DU T Bij = 1 and DT T Bij = t − T B ij if t > T B ij , 0 otherwise. See, e.g. Perron (1989 III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II   2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 Administrative/BE (left scale) Arts/SN (right scale) MW Introduction Figure 5 : Employment-to-population at working age ratios (socially insured) in selected cross-sections. Source: Federal Employment Agency, Federal Statistical Office, Regional Statistical Office (Saxony-Anhalt), own calculations. joint significance of the corresponding dummy coefficients (β 2,ij,t and β 3,ij,t ):
H 0,t : β 2,ij,t = β 3,ij,t = 0,
The time horizon for the break determination is set to lie within 04/2014 (passing of the cabinet resolution in 04/2014) and 03/2015 (three months adjustment period).
We proceed constructing a counterfactual,ŷ ij,t , by setting the estimated break coefficients equal to zero:ŷ
In doing so, we estimate how the employment variable would have evolved if there were no (unidentified) structural breaks. The next step is the computation of the trend deviations,
This procedure controls for a-priori, structural differences and therefore, helps to make the cross sections comparable. recently exhibited a slowdown. The question is whether these exemplary differences can be explained with the minimum wage introduction.
Employment Effects
To identify the minimum wage effect, we use a simple model of the form:
We regress the trend deviations on the minimum wage affectedness (AW C ij ) and a constant using OLS. 18 In line with the literature, we assume that the minimum wage introduction is exogenous (see, e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 2007 We observe that the minimum wage did not have an effect on marginal employment prior to the minimum wage introduction. However, after its introduction, the minimum wage has a significant negative effect on marginal employment. This is well in line with our hypothesis discussed in Section 2 and the development depicted in Figures 1 and   2 . Given the stark plunge in the mentioned figures, one could have expected a stronger minimum wage effect. Pusch and Seifert (2017) argue that more than 40% of all affected workers (ME) still earn less than the minimum wage in early 2015. Furthermore, the fraction of employers that undo the minimum wage, e.g. due to differences between actual and contractually agreed working hours or unpaid overtime, is especially high in low-wage industries. Therefore, our findings potentially underestimate the negative effect. The results are robust with respect to the measure of the minimum wage affectedness, i.e. they do not change if we use the share of affected workers as an explanatory variable.
On the contrary, the minimum wage introduction has a positive effect on employment subject to social insurance. One could think of anticipating agents as an explanation for the increase in employment prior to the minimum wage introduction. We find that the positive effect (statistically and economically) is more pronounced in 2015. As in case of marginal employment, the choice of the explanatory variable does not influence the qualitative results.
The fact that marginal employment is basically unaffected until 01/2015 makes the transformation of ME into SIE unlikely. However, the stronger effect on SIE combined with the negative effect on ME in 2015 supports the transformation hypothesis. We further evaluate the transformation effect in the next section.
Using a dummy for East Germany does not change the (qualitative) results in case of SIE. However, the results are slightly different for marginal employment (see Appendix, Table A6 ). While the sign of the minimum wage coefficient does not change, it is significant at the 5% level in October and November 2014. Furthermore, the coefficient is larger in 2015. Hence, the dampening impact of the minimum wage on ME in East Germany appears stronger. Although the dummy coefficient for East Germany is not significant, the negative sign supports this hypothesis. Taking the higher affectedness in East Germany into account, this finding could be the result of nonlinearities. Practically speaking, it might be more than twice as difficult for an employer to raise a worker's hourly wage by 0.50e as opposed to 1e.
One could argue that it is necessary to use a fixed effects model to account for unobserved effects such as policy differences across states or varying demand elasticities across industries.
The inclusion of state fixed effects does not change the qualitative results for both forms of employment. This is not surprising because differences in policy changes across states over the relevant period seem to be neglectable. Estimating a model with industry fixed effects, however, entirely removes the significance from the minimum wage coefficient (both forms).
Recall that the minimum wage affectedness is mainly driven by industries. Hence, using industry fixed effects we already include a variable which captures the affectedness to a considerable extent. Therefore, it is not surprising that the actual minimum wage variable looses its explanatory power if industry fixed effects are included.
Transformation Effect
To analyze whether SIE rose in those state-industry pairs in which ME decreased, we estimate the following relationship:ỹ
whereỹ SI ij,t andỹ M E ij,t denote the residuals from (8) for socially insured and marginal employment, respectively. Contrary to (9), this specification does not account for the minimum wage at all. Hence, it is possible that a cross section exhibits and an increase in socially insured employment and a decrease in marginal employment that is unrelated to the minimum wage. As shown in section 3, a few cross sections are almost unaffected by the minimum wage. We therefore restrict our sample such that only cross sections with an above the (unweighted) German average minimum wage affectedness remain in the sample. 20 Recall that we intend to analyze if the effects on both forms of employment are related with each other. Since we only detect a negative employment effect on marginal employment in early 2015, the following estimations are only carried out for the period 01/2015 to 03/2015. If the transformation hypothesis were correct, we would obtain a negative coefficient δ 1 . Our initial suspicion regarding the hypothesis (see Figure 1) confirmed by the values reported in the second column of Table 2 . Despite an increase in employment subject to social insurance and a decrease in marginal employment, we do not find evidence for a relationship between the changes in both forms of employment as indicated by the p-values. We therefore reject the transformation hypothesis. Using the 20 That is, AW C > 1.81% . The number of observations decreases to 80. median as the threshold criteria does not change this finding.
Vom Berge and Weber (2017) argue, based on micro data, that twice as many mini-jobs were transformed into socially insured jobs in January 2015 in comparison to January 2014. However, they also find that for every 100 transformed jobs, 58 (full and part time) socially insured jobs were destroyed and hence, the net effect on socially insured employment is not equal to the increase of transformed jobs. Because our approach only analyzes the net effect, the results do not contradict vom Berge and Weber (2017) .
Conclusion
Our first contribution to the literature is the computation of two variables which measure the minimum wage affectedness for a large number of cross sections based on aggregate monthly income data. We use these variables to show what many economists predicted.
Our results indicate a negative effect on marginal employment and a positive effect on socially insured employment. However, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that the minimum wage induced a transformation of mini-jobs into jobs subject to social security.
A recent report by Bellmann et al. (2016) indicates that a reduction of working hours is the major adjustment channel for affected firms. It is therefore important to study the intensive margin to fully understand the employment effects of the minimum wage introduction. Unfortunately, the data are not readily available for such an analysis.
Another reasonable extension is to use micro data on earnings, such as data from the structure of earnings survey, to construct a minimum wage variable. However, the next iteration of this survey is not due before 2018.
German states
Abbreviation State
SH
Schleswig-Holstein Table A1 : Index of German federal states. • Interval k = l below which income x exceeds T H ij for the first time (i.e. w month < 1400e): l = 6 (see Table A3 )
List of industries
• Sum of workers with w month < 1400e (i.e. k = 0 to k = 6): 6 k=1 n k ij = 1000 
